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It appears far more natural and rewarding to consider “fuzziness” spread over the 
category of closed sets and semicontinuous set-valued mappings than over a set of 
points and point-to-point functions considered hitherto; for, none will argue that 
we actually “see” points (and not sets and singletons) when we study fuzzy sets and 
systems. This change of attitude merely necessitates an extension of the membership 
function to set-valued mappings and-with regard to dynamics-a transcription of 
ordinary differential equations to differential inclusions (i.e., orientor field equations 
in the case of control problems). However, the proper perspective now requires 
topology in the spaces under consideration and a shift from Boolean algebra to 
Brouwerian algebra since fuzziness disobeys some of the fundamental laws, notably 
tertium-non-datur and transitivity. Also, in faithful adherence to intuitionistic 
thinking, we have to consider the cardinality of sets as being, at the most, poten- 
tially infinite, never actually infinite. This emphasizes the constructivity as well as 
the subjectivity aspects of any fuzzy set theory. Both hypotheses (concerning 
topology and logic), taken jointly, already program (in the limit) a fundamental 
uncertainty relation in fuzzy set theory, very much like the celebrated Heisenberg 
uncertainty relation in quantum mechanics, if we make the fuzzy quantum (the 
greatest negligible set) and the physical quantum correspond to one another. These 
ideas will be introduced into the formalism of orientor field control in a companion 
paper to follow. I” 1987 Academic Press, Inc 
I. REVIEW OF RELEVANT QUANTUM MECHANICAL PRINCIPLES 
In his critical study of fuzzy reasoning Lee [22] came to te conclusion 
that the problem of uncertainty in fuzzy logic is not well taken care of. As 
far as we know, this statement still holds today, over ten years later. 
Now, the deepest probed and best understood concept of uncertainty is 
undoubtedly that associated with the well-known Heisenberg uncertainty 
relations. Because of their relevance to the results of this paper, we shall 
take a closer look at the foundations of quantum mechanics and the 
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inherent uncertainty notion. Recent results in this discipline establish an 
overall unified and technically cogent development of the theory of quan- 
tum mechanical systems from a completely geometrical point of view. In 
tune with this trend, we say today that every irreducible complemented 
modular lattice L of finite rank is a geometry if and only if every line in L 
has at least three points lying on it. Thus, quantum mechanical systems 
exhibit logics which form some sort of projective geometries (cf. [ 141 and 
[38]), and which are consequently nondistributive, using the weaker law of 
modular identity instead. Moreover, quantum logic has to be an orthocom- 
plementary lattice because in modular nondistributive lattices mere com- 
plementary operations fail to be one-to-one operations. 
When quantum logic is represented as the lattice of subspaces of a 
Hilbert space, the physical quantities, or observables, are represented by 
selfadjoint linear operators. It is these operators which play the role of 
“random variables” in quantum theory, in contradistinction to classical 
probability theory, where the random variables are just real-valued 
functions on the space of possible outcomes which are measurable with 
respect to a Boolean a-algebra of subsets which can-in an obvious 
way-be thought of as a Boolean a-algebra of propositions. If the quantum 
logic of subspaces of a Hilbert space is represented as a logical a-structure, 
certain equivalence classes of the set of random variables on the component 
Boolean cr-algebras determine, in a natural way, linear operators on a 
Hilbert space. Thus, physical quantities of the quantum theory are, in a 
sense, just equivalence classes of the classical theory, each one of them 
reflecting a physical quality of some sort. 
Since there is no implication operation in quantum logic (comparable to 
the Boolean operation la u h, see [ 15]), use is made of a relation 
implication of partial order type. Thus, partial order and orthocomplemen- 
tation play in quantum mechanics the part of implication and negation, 
respectively. Indeed, let L be a a-lattice with elements u (first) and n (last) 
and an orthocomplementation I: u + u’; m, 0’ EL, which satisfies the 
following axioms: 
(i) (a’)’ =a, UC L, 
(ii) (u<h)*(h’<uL), a, hEL, 
(iii) uvui=rl, UEL. 
DEFINITION 1.1. A a-lattice L is called a logic if, in addition to (i)-(iii), 
it also satisfies the implication 
(iv) (u<h;u,h~L)=>(h=uv (a’ oh)). 
DEFINITION 1.2. An observable is said to be a map ccl carrying a Bore1 
set EE B([W) from [w into L and such that 
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(i) .k(R) = n, 
(ii) p,(E)Ip,(F) whenever En F= 0. 
(iii) pL,(u7:, E,)=VT=,p,(E,) if EinEi=O, i#j, {E,)cB(R). 
DEFINITION 1.3. A state is said to be a map py, from L into 
Ru { +cc}u 1-m) such that 
6) p,(0) = 0, 
(ii) P,(L ‘,^= 1Uj) =C,‘= 1 pq(Uj), U;-laj, j#j? Ia,} c L. 
In general, pq may attain the “values” + cc or -cc, in which case 
p,(a) 3 0 is called a positive signed state and p,(a) < 0 a negative signed 
state. In our restricted terminology, a state shall be a positive signed state 
characterized by p,(n) = 1; the reason being that every co-dimensional 
Hilbert space is diffeomorphic with its unitsphere (see [5]). 
We are now in a position to formulate the four axioms common to 
classical mechanics and quantum mechanics, using the following sym- 
bolism: A denotes the set of all observables CI of a physical system Z, @ 
stands for the set of all states cp of L’, and p: A x @J x IF!(R) -+ [0, l] is a 
real-valued function. 
If both the observable LYE A and the state (PE @ are fixed, then 
B(R) -+ [0, 11, i.e., Ewp(cc, cp, E), is a probability measure on B(R). The 
axioms, equally valid in classical mechanics and in quantum mechanics, 
run as follows: 
(Al) P(K cp, 0)=0, ~(a> cp, R)= 1, 
~(a> cp, E, 1 E,,...) = i ~(a, cp, E,), 
,= I 
UfZA, q~@, EEEB(R), EinE,=(2(, i#j. 
(AZ) // (~(a, cp, E) = ~(a’, v, E)) * (a = u’), 
rpt@ 
~~~(~(a,~,E)=~(cr,~‘:E))~(cp=cp’). 
(A3) (a,, az,..., E A) A (E,, Ez,..., E W)) 
* %+A C(P(G ~3 E,) + ~(a,, q, E,) 6 11 
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(A4) Let p: B(W) + L be an L-measure (defined below). There exists 
an observable CI E A such that p = p,, i.e., a unique L-measure pz assigned 
to every observable c( E A. 
The above axioms have the following interpretations: 
(Al) p(a, cp, E) is the probability that a measurement of an operator 
(observable) E for a system C in state cp yields a result belonging to E, a 
member of the smallest Boolean a-algebra B(R) of Bore1 sets on IR. 
(A2) states that the only way to distinguish between any two obser- 
vables (resp. any two states) is by experiment: two observables (resp. two 
states) yielding the same measurement results for all Bore1 sets and all 
states (resp. observables) are considered to be identical. 
(A3) and (A4) will be appreciated as necessary postulates from the 
following arguments: Let us, first, form the Cartesian product 8 = A x B(R) 
and call its elements (c(, E), (p, F),..., experimental sentences. By the 
introduction in 8 of an equivalence relation z, defined by 
(4 4 25 (8, F) iff p(ix, cp, E) = p(p, cp, F) for each cp E CD, 
we obtain the quotient space L = 9’1% with the (previously mentioned) 
equivalence classes [(a, E)], [(la, F)],..., as elements displaying various 
qualities of the system. 
The ordering of L is accomplished by the equivalence: 
([(a, WI d C(B, VI I= (~(a, cp, E) d PM, cp, F) for each v, E @I, 
d being the relation of partial order in L. We obviously have then 
C(% aI1 = C(T R - 01, 
and since p(cc, rp, R-E)= 1 - p(cc, cp, E), the mapping 1: L--f L, i.e., 
C(x, ~91 w [(cc, WI’, is a well-defined orthocomplementation in the par- 
tially ordered set L. Henceforth, we shall call L the logic of the probability 
function p. Actually, p induces in 8 a relation-implication (called p- 
implication by Maczynski [24]) which is defined by 
expressing that the truth of (p, F) IS more probable than that of (c(, E) in 
every state cp E @. The p-implication is, of course, reflexive and transitive; 
we may use it to replace the equivalence relation in 8 by the expression: 
((a, 0% (A F)) 
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Now, let pm: B(R) + L, i.e., Et-+ [(cI, E)], be an L-measure on D(R) for 
every c( E A and p,,,: L + [0, I], [(a, E)] I-+ p(~, cp, E), be a probability 
measure on L. Then (A2) confirms that pz # p,$ and cp # $ iff pv, # pti. 
Hence 
and while the family {p,fzE A exhausts L, the family ( pV jVE 0 is full (i.e., 
(p,(a) < p,(h)) * (a < h) for every cp E @ and a, h E L). Mackey [23] has 
shown that these two families completely define A, @, and p. This is due to 
the fact that the properties of p(ct, cp, E) depend essentially on L. Moreover, 
it is the logic L which decides whether p(~, cp, E) describes a system in 
classical mechanics or in quantum mechanics. This probability satisfies 
indeed the axioms (Al)-(A3). The elements of the Cartesian product 
d = A x E8( R) have appropriately been called experimental sentences, a 
typical sentence (a, E) stating that “a measurement of the observed quan- 
tity a yields a result in E.” Sentences entering the same equivalence class 
represent jointly a physical quality of some sort. However, no certainty 
about the truth or falsity of (CI, E) exists before the actual experiment is 
carried out; the theory merely states the probability of the truth of the sen- 
tence (cz, E) in the system state cp. But if we wish to speak of a logic of 
experimental sentences, we must associate a logical value with each sen- 
tence. The only reasonable approach for this appears to be the inter- 
pretation of p(c~, cp. E) E [0, I ] as the logical value of (2, E) in state cp E @. 
If 
for every cp E @, 
we shall hold (a, E) and (p, F) as contradictory sentences, meaning that the 
sum of the two logical values is again a logical vaiue within the unit inter- 
val. (CI, E) and (/?, F) are certainly contradictory if En F= @. We therefore 
comprehend (A3) as saying: 
“For any sequence of pairwise contradictory experimental senten- 
ces (ct,, E,), i= 1, 2 ,..., there exists an experimental sentence (fl, F) 
whose logical value is the sum of the logical values of the sentences 
(cl;, E,) for i= 1, 2 ,...” 
and we have the result: (/I, F)-((a,, E,) v (a,, E,) v ...), which reveals 
that without (A3) there would be no connecting relation between different 
observables of the same system, and it would be impossible to speak about 
relations between different physical quantities of the same system. This 
axiom is, therefore, indispensible. 
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Let 1 (c(, E) = (~1, R - E). The function I obviously has the properties of 
negation in the set B since: 
1 (c(, E) is false whenever (u, E) is true, and 
11(!x,E)=(a,E). 
We now see that the set of experimental sentences &, endowed with this 
negation (1) and with the p-implication (p satisfying the axioms 
(Al)-(A3)), forms a kind of logical system. The result of a logical iden- 
tification of equivalent sentences of a formalized theory T is a so-called 
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of T. Thus, the logic (L, <, I) in B may be 
conceived of as a Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra for the formalized system of 
experimental sentences. In this case, the sentence “(c(, E) or (p, 6’)” has 
sense (i.e., has a definable probability of truth) whenever (c(, E) and (fi, F) 
are mutually contradictory (conforming to (A3)). In classical mechanics 
the sentences “(a, E) or (p, F)” and “(a, E) and (,!I, F)” always have 
physical sense; in this case L is a Boolean algebra. It is, on the other hand, 
a fundamental hypothesis of quantum mechanics that-due to the Heisen- 
berg uncertainty relations- the above sentences do not always have 
physical sense in quantum mechanics; in this case L is an orthomodular cr- 
orthocomplemented poser (partially ordered set). 
As for (A4), we should note that every observable QEA is uniquely 
determined by a corresponding L-measure pZ. However, so far we have not 
demanded that there be a certain observable to every a-measure on B(R). 
This requirement is imposed on the system by (A4). Its physical 
significance is the following: 
Given a set of experimental sentences QEe 8, one for every 
Bore1 set in R such that E--f [Qc] is an L-measure, we are able 
to define an observable as a physical quantity corresponding to 
each of the experimental sentences. 
This axiom makes it possible to study the properties of QE as well as the 
relations between observables. Moreover, we may identify the set of obser- 
vables with the set of all L-measures. Now, let ,f: R + R be a real Bore1 
function on R, and let 3 E A be an observable. It is not hard to show that 
&OS -’ is an L-measure. Also, (A4) implies that there corresponds an 
observable to this measure; let us denote it by ,f(cc). We obtain immediately 
the equality p”rcl, = p3 q,f’ ‘, and, by virtue of p(.f(a), cp, E) = PP&E), 
finally p(.f(a), cp, El = PP,~,,(E) = PPJ~ ‘(E) = ~(a, cp, f’ ‘(WI. This result 
suggests the physical construction of the observable j(a): 
if the measurement of ,f‘(c() yields a result in E, then the 
measurement of c( yields a result in .f ‘(E). 
In classical mechanics L = EE( R6”); if p<,,: 5( lR6”) + [IO, 1 ] is a state, 
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,f,: E-8’” -+ R an observable and E a Bore1 set on the straight line, then the 
probability that a measuremnt of (Y yields a result in E is equal to 
p(cc, cp, El = P,PL,(E) = P,C.~’ ‘t-01 = i &I, 
where p;: E + ~,,f’ ‘(E) is the Lebesgue measure on R. In contrast to this, 
the logic of quantum mechanics is an orthocomplementary poset selected 
in such a way that the theory based on this logic generates results very 
close to the experimental results. This requirement appears to be optimally 
fulfilled by the 
QUANTUM MECHANICAL POSTULATE. The logic L ,fi)r u yuuntum 
md~unicul system is isomorphk kttith the partiall?~ or&red srt L(H) of’ ull 
closrd .suhspucc.s of‘ u st~peruhle M, -dimm.sionul Hilhert spuc’c. 
I is in this case the orthogonal complementation of a subspace, i.e., for 
NE L(H) one has N’= [.YE H: (.u, u) =0 for every UE N). 
We now converge to the main points of our concern: 
(a) commutativity and noncommutativity of operators in H, 
(b) the notion of measure on the subspaces of H (Lebesgue measure 
fails in such spaces), and 
(c) the Heisenberg uncertainty relations, 
Projection in Hilbert space H will always be understood as an orthogonal 
projection, i.e., a selfadjoint and idempotent operator P* = P= P”, acting 
in H. According to Maczynski [ZS], two projections P and Q commute, 
i.e., PQ = QP, iff the following inequality holds for all vectors u E H: 
Based on this result, we characterize the commutativity of projections in H 
by associating with every pair of projections P, Q a real number 
6( P, Q) E [0, I], such that 
d(P, Q,=O iff P and Q commute. 
For noncommuting projections, 6(P, Q) is interpreted as a “commutativity 
gap,” measuring the degree of noncommutativity of P and Q. For I-dimen- 
sional projections 6(P, Q) coincides with the square root of the transition 
probability 19, $1’ between two states cp, $ (unit vectors) in quantum 
mechanics. Indeed, for projections P, and P, onto the l-dimensional sub- 
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spaces generated by cp and $, and assuming P, # P,, we have 6( P,, P$) = 
I(R $)I. Thus, 
d(p,pp, P$/) = 0 whenever P, and P, commute or else P&P,,,. 
Generally, two nonvanishing projections P and Q 
commute iff sup lim (IIf’42+ llQ4’- II(pQ)“~l12)= 1,
I~uIl = 1n - x) 
do not commute iff 1 < sup lim (IIPull”+ IlQul12- jl(PQ)“uIl’)d2. 
Ilull = I ,I + 7’ 
We might add that the commutativity gap is equal to zero if one of the 
projectors vanishes; it is greatest when the transition probability 
approaches unity. 
The definition of the commutativity gap may, of course, be extended to 
arbitrary selfadjoint operators in a Hilbert space. Indeed, using the spectral 
theorem, we may identify each selfadjoint operator A with the spectral 
measure PA associating with every Bore1 set EE B(R) a projection P;j in H. 
Hence, a commutativity’ gap between two selfadjoint operators A and B 
acting in H can be defined as 
&,(A, B) = sup (Pi., P;). 
E.FE M(R) 
The commutativity gap 6,), defined by means of spectral measures, differs 
from the commutativity gap 6 defined earlier; namely, if P is a projection, 
then the spectral measure p corresponding to P is concentrated on the set 
{0, 11, and we have p( I ) = P, ~(0) = P1. Hence, for projection, the relation 
between 6,) and 6 is given by S,,(P, Q) = max(G(P, Q), d(P’, Q), d(P, Q’), 
d(P’, Q’)). Since two selfadjoint operators commute iff their spectral pro- 
jections commute, we also have 
((5,( A, B) = 0) E (A and B commute). 
We compute 6,(A, B) for selfadjoint operators with a pure point spectrum 
acting in a separable Hilbert space from the formula 
&,(A, B) = W(cp> $)I, 
over all unit eigenvectors cp of A that are not eigenvectors of B and over all 
unit eigenvectors rc/ of B that are not eigenvectors of A. If there are no such 
eigenvectors, A and B commute and we have 6(A, 13) = 0. 
The failure of the Lebesgue measure has been more than adequately 
compensated by the so-called Gleason definition of measure on the sub- 
spaces of H. Looking at quantum mechanics from the central limit point of 
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view (Cushen and Hudson [ 1 l]), . i e, in the light of a noncommutative 
analogue of axiomatic probability theory of the foundations of quantum 
mechanics, the field of events appears replaced by a non-Boolean lattice of 
propositions, in practice by the lattice L of subspaces of a separable Hilbert 
space H. A countably additive function from L to the closed unit interval 
constitutes a state (see Definition 1.3) the noncommutative analogue of a 
probability measure. 
The deep theorem of Gleason [ 131 asserts that every state on the lattice 
of subspaces of H is of the form 
911 + t r pP,, , 
P,, being the projection onto the subspace (manifold) (Vi, p a density 
operator in H, i.e., a positive operator of unit trace (conversely, every den- 
sity operator determines, by the above relation, a state). Our non- 
probabilistic formulation of this important theorem runs as follows. 
THEOREM I. 1 (Gleason). A Gluson measure on H is u real-valued 
functional on the complete complementary luttice of closed subspaces of H, 
which is a-additive on the sequences qf pairwise orthogonul closed subspaces. 
All measures on the closed suhspuces 91 c H are qf the kind 
p(S) = tr TP,,, 
T being a unique selfadjoint operator of’ the truce clu.ss, w*hile P,, denotes the 
orthogonal projection on !R 
A lattice homomorphism from the field of Bore1 subsets of R to the lat- 
tice of propositions (i.e., B(R) --t L) determines an observable, analogous to 
the classical random variable identified with its set-function inverse. In case 
of a Hilbert space, an observable determines a projection-valued measure 
on R and thus, by the spectral theorem, a selfadjoint operator; conversely, 
every selfadjoint operator c( with spectral resolution 
induces a lattice homomorphism sending each Bore1 set E into the range of 
P,(E). We may thus use the terms “state” and “density operator”---on the 
one hand-and “observable” and “selfadjoint operator”-on the other 
hand-interchangeably. Hence, a state cp and an observable a induce a 
probability measure on iw by E -+ tr VP,(E), which is interpreted as the 
probability distribution for the measured value of the observable in state cp. 
The mean value is 
(c(),,, = j id(tr qP,(i.)). 
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The noncommutativity theory manifests itself (in general) in the non- 
existence of joint probability distributions for observables which, as 
operations, do not commute. Such observables are assumed to be com- 
patible in the sense that it is impossible to measure both simultaneously. 
This is particularly the case for a pair of canonically conjugate position and 
momentum operators q and p. It is customary to state the Heisenberg 
uncertainty relations in the two equivalent forms: 
Ap . Aq 3 h = 21d1, (1.1) 
AE.At>h. (1.2) 
This equivalence is a consequence of the relativistic standpoint that energy 
E and momentum p are quantities of the same kind; indeed, 
p.2 1 i6.u 
is the spatial part of the relativistic 4-vector, 
E=$ is its temporal component. 
But then q and t must also be of the same kind; this follows independently 
from the canonical equations of Hamilton, if p is kept constant (a case 
known in physics as cyclic coordinate). 
Epistemological Rtlflections 
The decisive move of quantum mechanics has been to give-up all “objec- 
tivity” of natural events. Indeed, the new lesson quantum mechanics has 
tought us is that the same physical object may present itself in two 
mutually excluding forms: as corpuscle and as wave. There is, however, no 
contradiction between the actually observed properties of an electron, for 
example; this appears only when we assume that the electron is entitled to 
these properties even when we do not care to observe them. Both, cor- 
puscle and wave views may be reconciled only if it is assumed that the 
momentum of a particle at a known position cannot be known. 
Every observation presumes a causal chain and yields a “visible” result. 
However, we may not assemble the single results and causal chains into a 
model of a nature existing per se. Which of the mutually complementary 
sides of nature we will be facing, depends largely on our freely chosen 
experimental set-up, and the knowledge of one side excludes, of course, the 
knowledge of the complementary one. This appears to be the current state 
of our comprehension of quantum mechanics. 
C. F. von Weizsacker [40] has discussed the multi-valuedness of quan- 
tum mechanical truth statements at length. It appears that the truth values 
are true, false and undetermined; but, since we must mind complemen- 
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tarity, how are we to know the false or the undetermined to the true? We 
must look at von Weizsacker’s plea for dropping the tertium-non-datur 
with this inconsequence in mind. Nevertheless, a quantum physicist 
reporting on his experimental findings will say: “I know that A holds true.” 
This phrase stresses the fact that the notion of the object bears a relation to 
the knowledgeable subject, both with regard to his knowledge and to his 
will. Whenever I want to know something definite, I must give-up all 
knowledge relating to the complementary. According to von Weizsacker 
“there is a sharp boundary between awareness and non- 
awareness, which, however, is stripped of any objectiveness in 
nature, for 1 can place that boundary at will; only, I cannot 
make it vanish altogether.” 
Now, the observation of quantum mechanical events by means of some 
measuring apparatus obeying the laws of classical mechanics involves a cut. 
While the relations on the observer side as well as on the side of the obser- 
ved object are sharply determined, this cut is both necessary and con- 
venient to allow a perfect coupling of the two sides and to account for any 
interference due to measurement. This represents a restriction to the use of 
classical notions in the form of uncertainty relations (1 .l ) and (1.2). The 
position of this cut is of no importance for the formulation of laws of 
nature as long as its existence is acknowledged. With this understanding, 
the question referring to the exact position and the exact momentum of a 
particle must be considered as a virtual question only (the same as the 
simultaneity of events in the face of a finite speed of light) and rejected as 
ill posed in substance. 
A cut of the type described above must also exist between technical 
cybernetics and biocybernetics, and indeed between any pair of exact 
natural sciences. It is the author’s conviction that the class of all natural 
sciences constitutes a Stone space, i.e., a compact and totally disconnected 
Hausdorff space. The nonobservance of the respective boundaries and cuts 
is likely to deprive us of the desired knowledge and may well have been the 
cause of interdisciplinary failures in the past. 
That which we call science is concerned with two fundamental objects: 
(1) To disseminate the knowledge about nature which would put 
man in a position to utilize the resources and forces of nature to his advan- 
tage. 
(2) To allocate to man the right position in nature on the basis of a 
real insight into the relations prevailing in nature. 
These are also the principles of technical sciences with, perhaps, a greater 
emphasis on the first one. 
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II. SENTENCES IN BROUWERIAN ALGEBRAS 
In this section we shall lay down the algebraic foundation for the treat- 
ment of systems defined on fuzzy sets. Since fuzzy sentences are stated in 
the language of a Brouwer algebra, it is advisable to be aware of the dif- 
ference between classical and intuitionistic reasonings. To emphasize this 
concern, consider a propositional function W(X) in the arithmetic of natural 
numbers. 
To a mathematician, the problem of the truth of Q(S) is solved if there is 
a proof that the sentence 6 = lJ, W(X) is a theorem in arithmetic; he 
actually dispenses with the task of producing a construction of a number 
n E N such that o(n) is a true statement. To prove 6, a mathematician 
would first prove y = 1 U, 1 W(X) and then use the tautology y = 6. The 
truth of 6 follows then from the modus ponens rule 
Y A (Y’d) 
6 
(if . . . . then = + ). 
This procedure is unacceptable to the intuitionist; he demands a construc- 
tion of a number n E N satisfying w(n); failing this, both 6 and y j 6 are 
rejected. Moreover, since constructivity is restricted to finite sets, 
intuitionistic logic will only admit a potential infinity, never an actual one. 
But many sets have an infinite number of elements and the axiom of 
infinity is one of seven axioms of the ZermeloPFraenkel set theory; hence 
intuitionists reject the notion of a set as well as the whole set theory. Also, 
negation and disjuction are understood differently in intuitionistic logic: 
for, while (see [32]) 
o * 11~ is accepted, 11 w j o is rejected, and o, u o2 is 
considered true iff o, or w2 is true and there is a method deter- 
mining just which summand is true. 
Consequently, the tautology o u lw as well as the tertium-nondatur law 
have no validity in intuitionistic logic. Now, the metatheory of 
intuitionistic logic (the consequence operation) coincides with the theory of 
pseudo-Boolean algebras in the same sense as does the metatheory of 
classical logic with the theory of Boolean algebras. Hence follows that the 
theory of pseudo-Boolean algebras is the theory of lattices of open subsets, 
and every investigation of intuitionistic logic consists in an examination of 
lattices of open subsets of topological spaces. This in itself is a surprising 
fact. 
First, we shall establish the required terminology. 
DEFINITION 11.1. A relation R on a nonvoid set X and satisfying the 
conditions 
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(i) xRx (reflecivity), 
(ii) (xRy A yRx) 9 (X = y) (antisymmetry j, 
(iii) (xRy A yRz) =sxRz (transitivity), 
is said to be a relation of partial order, and the so ordered set a partially 
ordered set (poset). 
A relation which is merely reflexive and transitive is called quasi-order. 
On the other hand, a relation that is connected and satisfies (i), (ii), and 
(iii) is said to be a linear order. Connectivity requires that every pair of 
elements of a linearly ordered set be comparable, i.e. (putting x 6 y instead 
of xRy) we must have either .Y < J or J 6 .Y for all pairs of the ordered set. 
A collection of sets ordered linearly is called a monotonic family. 
Let A be an arbitrary nonvacuous set. Every mapping 
f’: A” + A, HEN, 
is called an n-argument operation defined on the set A. 
DEFINITION 11.2. An abstract algebra (briefly, algebra) is the name 
given to any ordered pair (A, 0) in which A is a nonvoid set and 
0 = {(I,, Ok,...) is the set of (usually finitely many) operations defined on A. 
Let (L, u, n) be an abstract algebra with two binary operations: u and 
n and, possibly, a smallest (u) and a greatest (n) element. We shall call 
xn ~1 the sum of the elements .Y and J, and .Y n J* the product of the 
elements s and y. Consider now the following axioms: 
(Ll) .ru~‘=j’u.u, snj’=!‘n.u; 
(L2) .~~((~‘u~)=(.uu~~)u~, sn(~~nz)=(.un.v)nz; 
(L3) .uu.u=.u,.un.u=.u; 
(L4) .uu(.rn~~)=.u, .un(.uuJ,)=.u; 
(L5) xn(yuz) = (xny)u(xn,-), .uu(.un;) = (xuy)n(.yuz); 
(L6) .yuu=x, xnn=x; 
(L7) xv-.x=n, xn--S=u. 
DEFINITIONS 11.3. (1) S = (L, u, n) is called a lattice if it satisfies the 
axioms (Ll)-(L4). It admits partial ordering in such a way that for all two- 
element subsets {x, I’} c L the sum coincides with the least upper bound 
(lub) and the product coincides with the greatest lower bound (glb); it is 
ordered if each pair of elements has a lub and a glb. A lattice is called com- 
plete if its every subset A c L possesses the least element u and the greatest 
element n. (lub = join; glb = meet). The following duality principle applies: 
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If a sentence Tl is a consequence of (Ll )-(L4), then the sen- 
tence T2, obtained by interchanging v and n, is also a con- 
sequence of (Ll )-( L4). 
(2) 2 is a distributive lattice if it satisfies axioms (Ll))(L5). 
(3) Lattice S = (L, u, n, i, u, n), fulfilling all axioms (Ll)-(L7) is 
said to be a Boolean algebra. 
The family 2x of all subsets of a nonvoid set X is a Boolean algebra with 
set-theoretical operations. 
DEFINITION 11.4. A nonvoid set V of elements of a lattice S is called a 
filter whenever 
(anhEV)--(uEV A heV) for all ~1, h E L, 
equivalently, 
(u,hEV)*(anbEV) and (UEV A u<h)*(hEV). 
A nonvoid set d of elements of a lattice is called an ideal (the dual to a 
filter) whenever 
(uuhEd)=(uELl A hEA) for all a, h 6 L, 
equivalently, 
(U,hEA)~(UUhEA) and (a<b A hEA)~(UELl). 
DEFINITIONS 11.5. (1) If the elements of a lattice S are subsets of a 
space X and u and n coincide with the set-theoretical union and intersec- 
tion, respectively, then L is said to be a set-lattice. 
(2) There are two notions of “complement” to an element a in a lat- 
tice L corresponding to the set-theoretical complement of a set A, being 
either the greatest subset -A of X disjoint from A or the least subset of X 
whose union with A yields the whole space X. These subsets are, in general, 
not equivalent. If L has the least element u, then c E L is called a n-com- 
plement of L provided that c is the greatest element such that an c = u. If 
L has the greatest element n, then CE L is called a u-complement of L 
provided that c is the least element such that au c = n. 
(3) If L is a distributive lattice and au c = n and an c = u, then c is 
a complement of a E L. The only other complement of importance is the n- 
complement, which--if existing-is called a pseudo-complement. 
(4) An element c EL is called pseudo-complement of a relative to b 
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(or modulo h) or relative pseudo-complement if c is the greatest element 
such that u n c d h. It is denoted by a EI h. By definition, 
(x<a 7 h)=(anx<h) for all .Y E L. (2.1) 
Since an h < h, we infer that h <a =1 h, provided that u =1 h exists, and if 
u and n exist in L, we have 
(a<h)=(uIh=n) and n7h=h 
(2.2) 
1u=u=1u. 
(5) An ordered set L # @ in which every pair of elements has a meet 
and satisfies (2.1) and (2.3) is (following Curry [lo]) called an implicative 
system, where 
un(u =1 h)<h. (2.3) 
For (further) information on implicative lattices and semi-lattices see 
Nemitz [ 301. 
(6) We say that a+ h is a complement of a relative to h (or a 
modulo h) if it is the least element c 3 an h such that u u c = n. If an 
element a of a distributive lattice L has the complement la, then, for every 
h E L, the complement a =I h of a relative to h exists and a 1 h = 1 a u h, 
where 1 au h is the pseudo-complement of u relative to h (it happens to be 
also the complement of a relative to h). 
(7) The notions dual to the relative pseudo-complement and to the 
relative complement are the pseudo-difference and the difference. An 
element c is said to be the pseudo-difference of h and a if it is the least 
element such that q u c 3 b; it is denoted by h 2 a. By definition: 
(x3h~u)=(uux~b) for x E L. (2.4) 
Since au b > h, we have b 2 b - a provided that h - a exists. Obviously 
(a-a)-(~ EL); and if u EL exists, then (u3h)=(h~u=u and 
h - u = h). Thus, the pseudo-difference b L a is the least element cd au h 
such that a u c = au 6. Suppose that L-I EL. We shall say that h-u is the 
difference of h relative to a if it is the greatest element c d au b such that 
an c = u. If an element a of a distributive lattice L has a complement la, 
then the difference h - u exists and b - a = b n la. 
DEFINITION 11.6. A relatively pseudo-complemented lattice has the unit 
element, but need not have the zero element u. If u EL exists, then L is a 
pseudo-Boolean algebra (L, u, n, 7, 1, LJ, n). An element of a pseudo- 
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Boolean algebra is said to be dense if ia = u; it is dense iff ~TCI= n. 
Element a is called regular if a = 11~. 
As already stated, (a * 11 a) is and (1 ia = a) is not admissible in 
intuitionistic logic; rejected is also the tautology au la and, therefore, 
also tertium-non-datur. Every pseudo-Boolean algebra may be conceived of 
as an algebra (L, u, A, =I, 1) with three binary operations and one unary 
operation. In the terminology of Wechler [39], a pseudo-Boolean lattice is 
termed an L-fuzzy algebra; the corresponding dual lattice is known as 
Brouwer algebra. 
DEFINITION 11.7. Lattices dual to pseudo-Boolean algebras are called 
Brouwerian algebras. Brouwer lattice is a notion between a lattice and a 
Boolean ring. Indeed, a lattice with unity is called Brouwer lattice if the 
pseudo-difference a A h exists for all elements a, h E I, in the sense of (2.4). 
An abstract algebra S = (L, u, n, 2, r ) is said to be a Brouwerian 
algebra provided that 
(i) (L, u, n) is a lattice with the unit element, 
(ii) I is a binary operation satisfying equivalence (2.4) 
(iii) r is a unary operation defined by TU = n A u. 
An important example of a Brouwerian algebra is order topology 
I’, =(Os, u, n,L, r), 
where 0, is the collection of all open sets of the quasi-ordered (i.e., 
reflexive and transitive) set (C, < ), u and n are the set-lattice operations, 
respectively, and 1 and r are defined thus 
RAS= 
i 
CEC: /j (CGC’A ~‘ES~C’ER) 
“EC 
rR= 
{ 
CEC: /j (c<c’ac’$R) 
(.‘E c 
A set B c C is considered to be open in C if 
whenever x E B and x 6 y, then y E B. 
The quasi-ordering relation is, in this case, the set-theoretical inclusion. 
THEOREM 11.1. Let 9I = (A, u, n, I, r ) he any distributive Brouweriun 
algebra. For every n E N, let A>,,, B,, + , c A be such thut 
(i 1 u2,? = A,, A2, a and b,, + , = Ah t LT?, , b e-w 
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(ii) fbvanycFA, {uIc:“EA~,~}E{A~~:~E~}, 
jt’1h:hEB,,,+,)E~A,,:kE~}, 
(iii) ,for any c,d~A, {(dna)Ic:~EA~,,}c fA,,:k~Nj 
Then there exists an order topology EG and a monomorphism h ,from BI to 
PS preserving u2,, and hz,, + , ,for all n E N. 
The proof follows from the following two lemmas: 
LEMMA 11.2. Let 91 he as in Theorem II.1 and let (Q) he u set ~firzji’nitr 
,joins and meets in VI: 
Finally, let x, y he elements of A sbr rtlhich the relution .Y < J’ does not hold. 
Then there esist.s u Q-idc>al A such that .Y 4 A lmd y E A. 
LEMMA 11.3. Assuming thut A E C, ,~herc~ C’ is the set of’ all Q-idwls 
qf U, then u A h E A ij’ and only) if; ,fbr each A’ E C such that A c A’, the 
,follou*ing implication ho&: lf h E A’, then N E A’. 
The condition: 
t1u f/ h,= /j (h,Ufl) 
ic I It f 
is fulfilled in every Brouwerian algebra, but 
(2.5) 
an A u,= A (u,na) (2.6) 
I+ I It 1 
is satisfied only in distributive Brouwerian algebras. Definitions II.6 and 
II.7 disclose the duality between the relative pseudo-complement a 2 h = 
la u h and the pseudo-difference u A h = 1~ n h. This duality is also 
present in the Heyting-Brouwer logic (see [33]). 
DEFINITION II.8 (Rauszer [33]). An abstract algebra (A, u, n, I, 1) 
is said to be a semi-Boolean algebra if (A, u, n, 7 ) is a relatively pseudo- 
complemented lattice and 1- is a speudo-difference. The algebra 
(A, u, n, =I, 2, 1, r, u, n) is occasionally called Heyting-Brouwer 
algebra whenever 
(i) (A, u, n, 1, 1, u) is a Heyting algebra with la=cr 7 n, 
(ii) (A, u, n, L, r, n) is a Brouwer algebra with TU= n 2 a. 
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To every pseudo-Boolean algebra A there exists a complete semi-Boolean 
algebra A’ and a monomorphism g: A + A’. To every Brouwerian algebra 
A there exists a complete semi-Boolean algebra A’ and a monomorphism 
h: A -+ A’. Semi-Boolean algebras play the same role in Heyting-Brouwer 
logic as Boolean algebras do in classical logic and as Brouwerian algebras 
in fuzzy (set) logic. Now, a Brouwerian algebra may be regarded as a set- 
lattice K(X) of all closed subsets of a topological space X if a pseudo- 
Boolean algebra is taken to be a set lattice G(X) of all open subsets of X. In 
this case, which will occur frequently in the sequel, we shall (following 
Kuratowski [ 191) identify the pseudo-difference with the closed set-dif- 
ference A -B for A, BE 2”‘. 
Sentences v&id in any Brouwerian algebra 
(x< y)*(x-26 y~z)n(z~ YdZLX)) 
(x < y) = (x A I’ = O), 
~I(x~~‘)=(~LX)V(=III), 
(2.7) 
It is easy to convert these formulas to sentences in a Brouwer set-algebra 
using the aforementioned equivalent pseudo-difference. 
III. TOPOLOGICAL NEGLIGIBILITY IN HYPERSPA~ES AND LATTICES 
In this section we redevelop some topological concepts and facts of 
interest in the general fuzzy set theory, of which a few will be of utmost 
importance for the main result of this paper and in the immediately 
following application papers. With regard to the latter, topological hyper- 
spaces, Caratheodory (set-valued) mappings and differential inclusions 
deserve particular attention. 
DEFINITIONS 111.1. (1) A topological space is a set 1 (whose elements 
are points) and a function (called closure: A -+ A) assigning to each set 
A c 1 a set Ac 1 in accordance with the following axioms (due to 
Kuratowski): 
(Al) AuB=Au& 
(z&2) AC& 
(A3) L3=a 
(z&4) A=A= 
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With the added axiom 
(AS) {p} = (p}, PE 1, (I, A) becomes a topological T,-space. 
T,, T,, T,.s, and T4 denote Hausdorff, regular, Tychonov, 
and normal spaces, respectively. 
(2) A topological Boolean algebra is any Boolean algebra with an 
Int (interior) operation which assigns to each element of the Boolean 
algebra its interior in accordance with the following axioms (due to 
Hausdorff): 
(II ) Int(an h) = Int(a) n Int(h), for all elements of the algebra, 
(12) Int(a) d U, 
(13) n = Int(n), 
(14) Int(u) = Int(Int(a)). 
(Capital letters are used in set-algebras). 
(3) A topological Brouwer algebra makes use of the Kuratowski 
axioms. In this case the pseudo-difference is the closure of the difference set. 
A topological Brouwer algebra is symbolized by (2 ‘, u, n, -, u, n); its 
elements are closed subsets of Y, u being the void set (which is an isolated 
element of 2 ‘), n = Y, and the three binary operations have the meanings 
defined earlier. 2’ is ordered by inclusion and is endowed with an exponen- 
tial (Vietoris) topology defined by the subbase of 2 ‘, i.e., by assuming that 
the collection of all sets is either of the form {K: Kc G) E 2” or of the form 
(~:Kn~f@j =2’-2’ f;, G being an open set. For a finite system of 
open sets G,, ,..., G,,, the family of sets 
B(G,, G ,,..., G,,)=2’;“n(2’.-2’ “‘)n ... n(2)‘-2’ ‘“) 
represents an open base of 2’ with the sets G, ordered by inclusion: 
GO> G, 3 .. . . The topology thus defined (and called exponential or 
Vietoris topology) is the coarsest one in which for A open (resp. closed) the 
sets 2A are open (resp. closed) in 2 ‘. It turns out that Y is the greatest and 
0 the smallest (but isolated) set of 2 r. 
DEFINITION 111.2. Let X and Y be two topological spaces and F a set- 
valued mapping, F: X + 2 ‘, assigning to each x E X a set F(x) E 2 ‘. F is 
said to be lower semicontinuous (1s~) in two cases: 
1 
and (‘) 
when the sets {x: F(x) c K} are closed in X for K closed in Y, 
(ii) when the sets 1.~: F(X) n G # a} are open in X for G open in Y. 
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F is (dually) called upper semicontinuous (USC) in two cases: 
Y, an(d) 
when the sets {x: F(x) A K # $3) are closed in X for K closed in 
(ii) when the sets {x: F(X) c G} are open in X for G open in Y. 
F is called a continuous mapping if it is lsc and USC at all points of X. 
DEFINITION 111.3. Let there be given a transformation F: X-t ‘$I( Y), 
where G@(Y) is the power set of Y (the existence of such a power set is 
guaranteed by an axiom of set theory). Selector of this transformation is 
the name given to any function ,f: X -+ Y satisfying the relation 
.f’(x) E f-(-x) for every YE X. 
The existence of a selector is, of course, a consequence of the axiom of 
choice (of the ZermeloPFraenkel set theory). 
In applicational problems involving selection, we shall mostly be looking 
for selectors exhibiting topologically interesting properties (under suitable 
assumptions on X, Y and F). Distinct from this type of selection is the 
definition of a set containing exactly one element from each set belonging 
to a given distribution of space X. Such a set may be called distribution 
selector. A special case of the selection problem is the so-called choice 
function. This calls for the construction of a function J’: R --f X sending the 
family R of nonvoid (not necessarily disjoint) subsets of space X into X, 
such that .f(E) E E for every E E R. The power set is, however, too rich in 
subsets for most applications; sharper theorems may be obtained from a 
family of closed or compact sets. This rule will also be followed in our 
work. It is appropriate to quote now Chang’s definition of topology as a 
family of fuzzy sets (to be defined later) in X= {x,) of individual variables 
with an associated membership function. 
DEFINITION III.4 (Chang [9]). A family of fuzzy sets in X is said to be 
a topology if it satisfies the following axioms: 
(Tl) @, XE T (the coarsest topology axiom), 
(T2) (A, BE T) => (A n BE T), 
(T3) (A,ET, ill (an index set))j(V,E,A,ET). 
Negligible Sets 
As is known, linear topological spaces constitute a generalization of n- 
dimensional vector spaces; actually, under a linear topological space E we 
understand a linear space over the ring of coefficients from OX, while both E 
and R are endowed with topologies with respect to which the addition of 
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elements in E and their multiplication with coefficients from R are con- 
tinuous operations. It is possible to introduce in a linear topological space 
s the notion of distance between its elements x = { 5, ,..., <,, ... } and ?: = 
{vi ,..., qn ,... } by means of the formula 
The metric in E induces in this set a natural topology if, by assuming as 
neighbourhood I’1’,’ (0 -CC < +a), of any point xg the set of all such 
elements y E E that p(xO, ~1) -C E, for given 6 > 0, the set E is transformed 
into a topological space. The topological space E is then called metrizable 
provided that the topology introduced by this metric is identical with the 
original topology of the topological space E. 
However, s is not a normable space by the Kolmogorov criterion of nor- 
mability, requiring that there be a convex bounded zero neighbourhood in 
a normable space. Let s denote the linear metric space which is the coun- 
table infinite product of lines. It is known that s is homeomorphic to 
Hilbert space I, and to all separable infinite-dimensional Frechet spaces 
(and thus, of course, to all such Banach spaces), see [ 1 ] and [7]. 
Any locally convex, complete, linear metric space is said to be a Frechet 
space. A normed Frechet space is, of course, a Banach space; but, the coun- 
table infinite product of lines R x R x ... = RX" is an example of a Frkhet 
space that is not a Banach space. It is known that all separable x-dimen- 
sional Frechet spaces are homeomorphic to each other. In all these spaces, 
and in the Hilbert cube INo, closed sets of infinite deficiency play an impor- 
tant role. 
DEFINITION 111.4. A closed set K in a Frechet space X is said to have 
infinite deficiency (or (~3 codimension) if X- K is =-dimensional, i? being 
the closure of the linear subspace spanned by elements of K. A 
homeomorphism of a space X onto itself is said to be stable if it is a finite 
product of homeomorphisms, each of which is the identity on some open 
set. 
It is convenient to define a Frechet manifold (F-manifold) to be a 
separable metric space which admits an open cover by sets homeomorphic 
to open subsets of s. Banach manifolds may be defined similarly. This leads 
to the study of homeomorphisms of F-manifolds onto dense subsets of 
themselves. We owe a first result of this type to Klee, who proved that, for 
any compact set K in I,, I, is homeomorphic to 1, - K. It was subsequently 
shown that for various types of subsets K of certain linear metric spaces X, 
X is homeomorphic to X- K. Bessaga [6] introduced the term “negligible” 
for such sets K. 
294 MIECZYSLAW ALBERT KAAZ 
DEFINITION III.5 (Bessaga [6]). A subset A of a topological space X is 
said to be negligible if X is homeomorphic to the difference set X- A. 
The topological classification of sets defines the class of smallest sets as 
comprising the so-called meager sets, i.e., nowhere dense sets, sets of first 
Baire category and sets of zero measure. The family of sets of the first 
category is a a-ideal, hence hereditary and countably additive. The next 
class of still small sets is occupied by compact sets and negligible sets. It is 
our intention to provide simple criteria for the negligibility of sets in two 
cases of importance in the general control theory: in topological vector 
spaces admitting continuous norms (i.e., containing radially convex bodies) 
and in certain Banach spaces. 
DEFINITION 111.6. A set A in a topological vector space is called narrow 
if there exists an incomplete continuous norm v(.) on X such that A is 
closed in the Banach space Y =complX, the completion of X with respect 
to the norm v(.). A subspace of a Banach space X is said to be strongly B- 
narrow (sa-narrow) if there is a continuous norm v(.) on X such that the 
original unit cell u of X is incomplete and A = U,, =, A,,, where A, is closed 
in Y = compl X. 
Completeness is, of course, not a topological property, i.e., the 
homeomorphic image of a complete space may be noncomplete. The con- 
cept of scT-narrowness is reasonable provided that v(.) exists; this is, in par- 
ticular, true in nonconjugate spaces with a base, while in separable reflexive 
Banach spaces the required norm v(.) does not exist. If X is an r3-dimen- 
sional topological vector space admitting a continuous norm (in particular 
a Banach space), every compact set A of X is narrow. For, under the 
assumptions of this statement, X also admits a continuous incomplete 
norm, and A is still compact under this new norm and thus closed in the 
completion with respect to it, Now, A is negligible if X is an a-dimensional 
topological vector space admitting a continuous norm, and A is a compact 
set of X. If X happens to be an x-dimensional Banach space and A a coun- 
table union of compact sets of X, then A is negligible. This assertion holds 
for the linear normed space X= cO (the linear manifold of all sequences 
converging to zero) since A is then so-narrow. The proof for non-separable 
spaces X follows from the fact that X is homeomorphic to the Banach 
space Y x cO. As a result of the above considerations we obtain the two 
announced criteria. 
THEOREM 111.1. Every narrow set qf’ any linear topological space is 
negligible. 
THEOREM 111.2. Every m-narrow set of un)’ Bunach space is negligible. 
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The proof of Theorem III.1 follows easily from certain arguments of the 
detailed proof of Theorem III.2 provided by Bessaga [6]. To this basic 
conception of negligible sets we shall add the notions of strongly negligible 
and metrically negligible sets due to Anderson [2]. 
DEFINTION 111.7. (1) A subset K of a space X is strongly negligible if, 
for any open cover G of X, there is a homeomorphism h: X+ X- K such 
that h is limited by G, i.e., for any p E X, there exists a g E G such that both 
p and h(p) are elements of G. 
(2) A set K in a metric space is referred to as metrically negligible in 
X if, for each E > 0, there exists a homeomorphism h of X onto X- K such 
that h moves no point by more than E. 
Clearly, in a metric space X, strong negligibility of a set K implies metric 
negligibility since we may select an open cover of X of mesh less than E. It 
is nontrivial, but follows from the researches of Anderson that, in an F- 
manifold, metric negligibility of a set K implies strong negligibility of K. It 
is of some importance, particularly for the analysis of dynamic systems. 
that studies of the conditions under which X and X-K are diffeomorphic 
are in progress. 
Second Thoughts on Fuzzy Set Principles 
The elements of fuzzy set theory are, by definition and nomenclature, 
sets endowed with a grading property, called fuzzy membership. A fuzzy set 
constitutes-so to speak-the primitive notion (Grundbegriff) in a for- 
malized theory of fuzzy sets, comparable to the notion of set in Zermelo 
Fraenkel set theory. In a less formal conception of fuzzy set methodology, 
we might give the fuzzy set a precise meaning (as some writers, notably 
Kwakernaak [21], have already done). This involves a generalization of 
the characteristic function of a set. 
The characteristic function xA : X+ {0, 1 ) of a nonvoid set A c X is 
defined by: 
%A~) = 
i 
1 for XEA, 
0 for XEX-A. (3.1) 
Mappiw~;2~l; {(Al> X with these values is clearly one-to-one and onto; 
thus 2x manifests agreement between 
The following formulas are well known. 
the YX and 2x notations. 
XX= 1, Xg5=0, 
XA~~~=XA'XB~ 
X(.4 -B)=%A-XAnB=XA(l-XR), 
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x(X-B)=x-B= 1 -xB, 
(A=(!AJ = (xAx) = my x&-)), 
(A=?4) + (LAX) = “;‘n x&)), 
(A = lim A,) = (x4(x) = lim xA,(x)). (3.2) n = m n=x 
The concept of a characteristic function of a set may easily be extended to a 
sequence of sets and, more generally, to a set-valued function, as required 
for fuzzy control in orientor field notation. Thus, let F: T -+ 2’ be a set- 
valued mapping such that F(t) = F, c Y for t E T. Then, the characteristic 
function xF of F(t) associates with each element y E Y a function 
X~(JJ)E (0, l}T, defined by 
for YE F,, 
for YE Y-F,. (3.3) 
On the other hand, the characteristic function of a sequence F, , E;,..., F,,,..., 
assumes as values sequences of numbers 
y(l), yC2’ )...) y’“‘,..., 
for which 
(n) = 1 if YEF,, Y 0 if ye(-F,,). (3.4) 
The novelty of the membership function vis-a-vis the characteristic function 
is the multivaluedness of the former. 
DEFINITION 111.8. (1) We choose to call a function pLa :X+ L mapping 
a nonvoid set A into a complete Brouwer lattice (algebra) L a grading 
function. It coincides with Zadeh’s membership function if L reduces to the 
unit interval. 
(2) The pair (A, ,LL) is called a fuzzy set in space X. 
If X happens to be a topological space, p becomes a mapping of a 
topological space into a Brouwerian algebra and we may avail ourselves of 
the excellent results of Kuratowski [18]. Kwakernaak [21] has suggested 
an interesting modification of Definition III.8 by projecting X onto a 
universe of discourse P and mapping the result into the unit interval, which 
amounts to a representation of the grading function p as the composition 
t 0 a, where a: X+ P at t: P + [0, 11. However, no proof of the com- 
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mutation of the diagram (X-r P -+ [0, 1 ] +- X) has so far been offered. In 
any case, the extended grading function corresponding to (3.3) would be of 
the form 
X&(Y) = 1 - 
1 
1 + max(O, II Y - all 1’ 
(3.5) 
We shall now advance the 
FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTION. The commutation gap 6 bears the same 
relation to quantum mechanics as the grading function p to the ,fuzzy set 
theory. 
Both 6 and p are grading functions; they are necessary conditions for the 
existence of uncertainties and reflect the “subjectivity” of sentences in the 
respective theories. Let us review the applicability of some of the fun- 
damental laws to fuzzy sets. Most important, the tertium-non-datur law 
fails in fuzzy set theory; and, since A =S r rA, but not conversely, the law 
of involution fails as well. We shall also reject transitivity. On the other 
hand, the law of contradiction, the law of syllogism, the law of con- 
traposition and both DeMorgan laws remain in force. This was the 
argument of Moisil [27] for calling the collection of fuzzy subsets A of a 
space X a DeMorgan lattice. However, in his formalization involution is an 
admissible law. The grading function is characterized by isotonicity. This 
has, of course, a bearing on the properties of the fuzzy measure which will 
no longer be additive or a-additive, but merely monotone (see Sugeno 
t-151). 
Fuzzy logic may be constructed following the principles of the 
Lukasiewicz multivalued logic, which requires the introduction of con- 
junction, disjunction, meet x n y = min(x, y), join x u y = max(x, y) and 
one of two possible implications (see Wechler [39]): 
tukasiewicz implication x -+L y = min( 1, 1 - x + y), which exists only if 
x, y run through {0, 1 } (this is equivalent to Theorem 1 in Lee [22]); 
remainder implication 
i 
1 if x<y 
x+ y= 
0 if x > y, 
valid in the whole linearly ordered set [0, l] (residuation in Wechler’s ter- 
minology). 
We recall that every linearly ordered set is a residual lattice with respect 
to composition as well as to meet, join, and 
1 
1 if x34 
x:y= 
X if x < y, 
provided that the axiom (x + y) u ( y + x) = 1 is satisfied. 
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It is apparent that the two implications exhibit different behaviour in 
case of multi-valuedness. 
OBSERVATION. To the multiplicity of implications in fuzzy logic 
corresponds a multiplicity of six relational implications in the quantum logiL 
of Birkhoff-von Neumann (see Kaaz [ 151). This in itself is an indication qf 
the existence of a basic uncertainty. 
It is also appropriate and timely to mention Kuratowski’s proof [ 171, 
that the nondelinability of a well ordering in a first order logic (a theorem 
of Tarski’s) is a consequence of the existence of analytic non-Borelian sets. 
This may-sentence by sentence-be carried over to the realm of fuzzy sets. 
But, to do it rigorously, a formal definition of truth (assumed to exist in 
the Kwakernaak treatment of the membership function) for sentences in 
fuzzy vernacular is required. According to Tarski [37], a classical 
definition of truth is a special case of the definition of satisfaction. If this 
principle also holds for fuzzilied sentences, then a specialization of the 
definition of fuzzy satisfaction already provided by Lee [22] would answer 
our need. 
For the benefit of the reader, we shall add a remark on the subsets of the 
real line. Suslin space is the name given to every metric space that is a con- 
tinuous image of the irrationals. If X is a Polish space (i.e., a separable and 
topologically complete space), then the family of all Suslin subsets is called 
a family of analytical sets (or A-sets, in honour of Alexandroff). Now, non- 
Borelian sets are known to exist in the space of irrationals. Hence Borelian 
sets must be in minority in the set of reals, and this, in turn, entails the 
existence of nonmeasurable sets in R. Deep investigations show that these 
facts are a consequence of the axiom of choice, and, as long as this axiom is 
a canon in the valid set theory, most of the interesting problems in game 
theory will remain undeterminate. This reveals precisely the dilemma of 
complementary systems in the face of non-measurable sets (consult also 
Banach’s problem of measure [4]). 
All of these difficulties vanish if we accept the Axiom of Determinateness 
(AD) proposed by Mycielski [29], in which case all sets on R! become 
measurable. This axiom would take the place of the axiom of choice in the 
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory; it would, however, introduce restrictions in 
the foundations of mathematics of another kind and perhaps more severe 
than the uncertainties due to the axiom of choice. We have mentioned this 
simply because the range of Zadeh’s membership function happens to be a 
homeomorphic image of the real line. 
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IV. BASIC UNCERTAINTY RELATION IN FUZZY CYBERNETICS 
We now proceed to formulate a rather fundamental relation reflecting 
the irreducible amount of uncertainty in fuzzy systems using the concept of 
negligible set, the rules gourverning Brouwerian algebra and logic and 
some general results touched upon in the previous sections. Let us denote 
by H the greatest negligible set and consider the topologized Brouwerian 
algebra 
ir)=(2Y,u,n,~,u,rl), (4.1) 
in which Y is understood to be a topoligcal space, 2’ being endowed with 
Vietoris topology; u and n are the lattice operations; -, the pseudo-dif- 
ference, is identified with the operation A - B, A, BE 2 ‘; Da, the isolated 
void set, is set equal to u, and Y to n. We shall consider 2) as the range of 
the set-valued function 
F: TX X+2’, (4.2) 
and the subsets F(t, x), closed in Y, to be orientor fields satisfying the dif- 
ferential inclusion 
.t E F( t, x), dt,,) =-x0, (4.3) 
which is easily recognized as a generalized differential equation for control 
systems if we put 
a=.f(C x, u)~f(L x, U(t, x))= F(r, x). 
The hinted at generalization provides for the set of controls to be a 
function of t and x. Since u is then a hidden parameter, the solution for the 
trajectory is thus easier to obtain. A number of selection methods and fixed 
point theorems assist this task. But this will be the subject of a subsequent 
paper. Remembering that the tertium-non-datur law fails in Brouwerian 
logic, we are free to consider the set Y - A n A to be in any way nonvoid. 
By putting 
Y-AnAzH (4.4) 
we obtain a relation indicating the lowest limit of uncertainty for fuzzy sets. 
This relation is fundamental in the same degree as H. Its similarity to the 
Heisenberg uncertainty relations, derived on a completely different basis, is 
striking for the following reasons: 
(1) (4.4) is an inequality relation just like (1.1) and (1.2). 
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(2) It is a product relation of “complementary quantities” as 
relations (1.1) and (2.1). 
(3) The logics underlying ( 1.1) and ( 1.2) and (4.4) are non-Boolean; 
conversion to Boolean logic is obtained in the limit case h = 0 and 
correspondingly H = 0. 
(4) In the sense of property (3) the Gleason measure in quantum 
mechanics and the monotone measure in fuzzy set theory (see Sugeno 
[ 151) reduce to Lebesgue measures. 
(5) The uncertainties in quantum logic and in fuzzy set logic give rise 
to more than one implication relation (six in the former and at least two in 
the latter). 
(6) One gap function measures the commutativity gap in quantum 
mechanics, the other measures the determinability gap due to fuzziness. 
Both represent necessary adjustments between the laws of quantum 
mechanics, respectively fuzzy set theory, on the one hand, and those of 
classical analysis (mechanics), on the other hand. Because of the limited 
information acquisition by means of the tools of one discipline in the 
domain of the other, only one of two complementary elements may be 
determined at a time; the freedom of preference introduces the element of 
subjectivity. Hence our statements apply only to the object of study and 
may not be generalized. 
Interpretation of Relation (4.4) 
To estimate the semantical content of the relation (4.4) it is quite 
instructive to ponder it from the mathematical (i) physical (ii), and 
intuitive (iii) points of view. 
(i) The development of formal mathematical systems from Hilbert to 
Gbdel has brought to the fore as the most important criteria facing 
mathematical theories their consistency (freedom from contradiction), com- 
pleteness and decidability. 
A formalized theory T is said to be consistent if it is impossible to obtain 
a formal proof in T of a formula a and for its negation lc( simultaneously. 
For, if a theory admits a contradiction but for two sentences (i.e., formulas 
containing no free variables) a and & then it is not hard to prove, using the 
laws of contradiction, tertium-non-datur and the logical implication 
((a 3 /I) = (1~1 v B)), that every conceivable statement would become a 
theorem of that theory. Needless to say that such a theory is worthless. 
A theory T is said to be complete if there exists a proof for every sen- 
tence (more precisely: for the sentence or for its negation) in the formalized 
language of T. Consequently, T is called incomplete if it contains an 
undecidable sentence. Finally, T is considered to be decidable if there is a 
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method by which may be ascertained in a finite number of steps whether an 
arbitrary formula of T is a theorem or not. If a decidability algorithm 
exists, the investigation reduces to mere mechanical operations. 
Now, an important theorem due to Giidel states that the consistency 
proof of every formalized theory containing the arithmetic of natural num- 
bers may only be carried out on the basis of a mathematical theory that is 
more extensive than the one whose consistency is to be proved. In par- 
ticular, the consistency proof of formalized arithmetic may be obtained 
only on the basis of a mathematical theory containing all of arithmetic and, 
necessarily, additional theorems not belonging to arithmetic. Since every 
physical and technical theory involves the arithmetic of natural numbers, 
the proof of its consistency demands the existence of formulas from without 
itself; but, the consistency of the arithmetic of natural numbers itself cannot 
be proved in spite of the conviction that nothing is more consistent than 
the counting: 1, 2, 3 ,.... Worse still, we have to accept that the arithmetic of 
natural numbers is incomplete and undecidable, and, as shown under 
strengthened conditions, every consistent formalized theory embracing the 
arithmetic of natural numbers is incomplete. 
In the face of these facts, mathematical ingenuity becomes invaluable. 
(ii) Long before the discoveries of Gbdel, physicists (very much con- 
cerned about the consistency of their science) have introduced the doctrine 
that a physical statement may become a law in the 3-dimensional space if 
and only if it exhibits invariance vis-i-vis the Lorentz transformation in the 
4-dimensional Minkowski space. The consistency proof is here obtained by 
the theorem “the physical statement is Lorentz invariant in a higher dimen- 
sional space.” 
(iii) Consider now a hypothetical ideal vessel filled with an ideal 
liquid of some sort. Looking at this system “microscopically,” we would 
say that the vessel is truly filled in the state of overflow, for 
otherwise--even if one drop only is missing-the assertion of an ideally 
filled vessed would be false. Consider the limit case when a single liquid 
drop decides on the ideal filling of the vessel. An observer of that drop is 
performing a perfect observation using an extremely acurate instrument, 
but he will be blind to the complementary quantity of liquid whose percen- 
tage change is unmeasurably small. 
It is contemplation of this sort which leads us to the conviction that the 
classes of fuzzy sets are never disjoint and, therefore, transitivity’ would be 
ill applied in fuzzy set theory. Indeed, Dedekind’s concepts of density and 
continuity would require suitable replacements. This implies, in turn, that 
actual fuzzy sets will exhibit indeterminacies very much greater than the 
uncertainty quantum H in (4.4). 
I Transitivity of order relation. 
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